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Abstract
We analyze the impact of elected competitors from the same constituency on legisla-
tive shirking in the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2017. The German electoral system 
ensures at least one federal legislator per constituency with a varying number of elected 
competitors between zero to four from the same constituency. We exploit the exogenous 
variation in elected competitors by investigating changes in competition induced by legis-
lators who leave parliament during the legislative period and their respective replacement 
candidates in an instrumental variables setting with legislator fixed effects. The existence of 
elected competitors from the same constituency reduces absentee rates in roll-call votes by 
about 6.1 percentage points, which corresponds to almost half of the mean absentee rate in 
our sample. The effect is robust to the inclusion of other measures of political competition.
Keywords Political competition · Accountability · Absence · Rent seeking · Political 
representation
JEL Classifications D72 · D78 · H11
1 Introduction
Political competition affects the behavior of politicians and their legislative activities 
(e.g., Bernecker, 2014; Gavoille & Verschelde, 2017). Voters usually benefit as politi-
cal competition increases because competition extends their opportunities to punish 
politicians for legislative shirking, that is, for neglecting their parliamentary duties. We 
investigate how the existence of elected competitors from the same constituency, but 
from different parties in the German federal parliament, affects legislative shirking. The 
German national electoral system institutionally guarantees that the number of elected 
legislators per constituency varies from one to five: At least one legislator, who faces 
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zero to four competitors, always represents a constituency. To establish a causal impact 
of elected competitors, we exploit changes in the number of competitors from legisla-
tors leaving parliament during the legislative period within an instrumental variables 
setting. Our approach allows us to explore the effect of more vigorous political competi-
tion when constituents can compare the behavior of already elected legislators directly.
Political competition is argued to increase citizens’ welfare, enhance the efficiency of 
decision-making, improve the quality of political outcomes, and reduce rent extraction 
efforts (e.g., Padovano & Ricciuti, 2009; Stigler, 1972). Empirically, political competi-
tion has been shown to affect economic development (Besley et al. 2010; Padovano & 
Ricciuti, 2009), public spending (Rogers & Rogers, 2000; Padovono & Ricciuti, 2009; 
Aidt & Eterovic, 2011), public debt (Skilling & Zeckhauser, 2002), tax revenues (Yogo 
& Njib, 2018), and government efficiency (Ashworth et  al. 2014; Sørensen, 2014). It 
influences the policy decisions of governments (Besley & Preston, 2007; Besley et al. 
2010; Bracco et al. 2019) and increases the supply of politically provided public goods 
(Arvate, 2013). The lack of political competition has been linked to diverse forms of 
favoritism (Solé-Ollé & Viladecans-Marsal, 2012; Curto-Grau et  al. 2018; Lévêque, 
2020), a less independent judiciary (Hanssen, 2004), and the concentration of power 
(Dal Bó et al. 2009).
At the individual legislator level, being exposed to more electoral competition relates 
to more active legislative processes (Gavoille, 2018; Gavoille & Verschelde, 2017), less 
outside income (Becker et al. 2009), less rent extraction (Ferraz & Finan, 2011; Kauder & 
Potrafke, 2016), and it influences legislators’ voting behavior (Kauder & Potrafke, 2019). 
Competition seems to foster a higher quality of politicians, measured either by education, 
previous employment in high-skilled occupations, political experience, cognitive and lead-
ership abilities, or even facial competence (Atkinson et al. 2009; De Paola & Scoppa, 2011; 
Galasso & Nannicini, 2011; Dal Bó et  al. 2017). It has been linked to absentee rates in 
roll-call votes (Galasso & Nannicini, 2011 and Bernecker, 2014 find less frequent absences 
as competition increases, while Besley & Larcinese, 2011 and Willumsen, 2019 find no 
effect). Electoral competition usually is measured by winning vote margins or the number 
of (effective) candidates who run for office. Our contribution introduces a novel and alter-
native measure of competition and analyzes its effects on legislative activity and the behav-
ior of individual legislators.
The existence of elected competitors from the same constituency but different parties in 
parliament largely has remained a neglected aspect of electioneering, subsequent legisla-
tive competition, and the activities of individual legislators. If more than one legislator 
is elected per constituency, voters can compare more easily the activity and the qualities 
of these legislators. Thus, elected competitors from the same constituency can directly be 
benchmarked against one another. They are active in the identical political environment 
and for the same constituents. Such a benchmark for evaluating a legislator’s behavior, 
activity and performance in parliament may allow voters to make more informed decisions. 
Electoral competition may amplify legislative competition and affect the behavior of legis-
lators. Politicians have been shown to be more accountable in elections and they are pun-
ished for poor performance when voters are provided with more reliable information that 
may allow for benchmarking (e.g., Ferraz & Finan, 2008; Banerjee et al. 2011). That effect, 
in turn, changes the incentives of legislators to take account of their constituents’ interests 
and increases legislative competition within parliament, that is, legislators may better ful-
fill their legislative duties and shirking is reduced (e.g., Bernecker, 2014; Gavoille & Ver-
schelde, 2017). Hence, we expect that competition from other elected legislators from the 
same constituency makes legislative shirking more costly and less appealing.
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The informative institutional setting at the German federal level allows us to analyze the 
effect of having one or more elected competitors from the same constituency on legislative 
shirking in parliament. The German electoral system combines elements of plurality voting 
with proportional representation in a mixed electoral system: one-half of all legislators is 
elected in a local constituency by the plurality rule, while the other half is elected from a 
party list at the state level by proportional rule. Candidates running for a direct mandate in 
constituencies typically appear on a party list, that is, they can enter parliament as direct 
candidates or through the party list (e.g., Frank & Stadelmann, 2021). Defeated candidates 
from the direct election in the constituencies may still win mandates through the party lists 
if they rank high enough on their respective party list. Consequently, the overall number of 
elected legislators per constituency can be more than one: next to the directly elected legis-
lator, one or more legislators may be elected through the party lists such that more legisla-
tors per constituency enter the federal parliament. In most cases, more than one legislator 
represents a constituency, that is, competitors are elected and benchmarking is possible.1
For our empirical analysis, we rely on data from German legislators in the federal par-
liament for the legislative periods from 1953 to 2017. As commonly is done in the litera-
ture, we use absentee rates in roll-call votes as a dependent variable to measure legislative 
shirking (e.g., Gagliarducci et al. 2010; Besley & Larcinese, 2011; Bernecker, 2014). Our 
results show that facing competition from elected legislators from the same constituency 
correlates negatively with the absentee rates of individual politicians. The result holds 
when controlling for a large set of covariates. We also account for legislator fixed effects 
such that the same individual legislators are compared when and when not facing elected 
competitors over different legislative periods.
While legislator fixed effects go some way toward address endogeneity issues, unob-
servable variables such as political ability or valence could be time-variant. To address 
such issues, we rely on credibly exogenous variation in the number of legislators per con-
stituency in an instrumental variables setting: During a given legislative period, legislators 
may end their mandates and leave parliament for reasons such as death, sickness or run-
ning for higher political offices. Vacant mandates are allocated in Germany without another 
election to the next candidate from the closed state party list who has not yet been elected 
to federal parliament. Therefore, legislators who leave parliament bring about changes in 
the number of competitors in two constituencies simultaneously: in the constituency they 
originally served, and in the constituency where a replacement candidate takes office.2 
Thus, we can generate two instrumental variables that credibly are exogenous to competi-
tion from other legislators from the two constituencies concerned, thus allowing us to esti-
mate the causal effect of political competition and elected competitors.
Employing our instrumental variables, we find that the existence of an elected competi-
tor from the same constituency leads to a statistically significant reduction of 6.1 percent-
age points in the roll-call-vote absentee rate. The effect is quantitatively substantial and 
represents about 49% of the mean absentee rate in our sample. It is robust to the inclusion 
of other indicators of political competition, that is, our measure of competition captures 
additional aspects of electoral competition and benchmarking in comparison to what is 
1 Online Appendix B provides a discussion and examples of the different ways voters receive information 
to compare and benchmark legislative behavior and activity of legislators elected from the same constitu-
ency.
2 If a legislator ends his/her mandate, his/her constituency loses a legislator (thus, competition weakens 
there), while another constituency gains a legislator (thus, strengthening competition there).
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reflected by, for example, vote margins. Subsample regressions and alternative specifica-
tions of the dependent variable capturing legislative shirking also yield robust results.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the institutional 
setting and our data. Section  3 presents the identification strategy. Estimation results, 
robustness checks, and mechanisms are presented in Sect.  4. Section  5 summarizes our 
results and offers our conclusions.
2  Institutional background and data
2.1  Electoral system
Germany operates a mixed-electoral system. Currently, 299 seats or about half of the Ger-
man federal parliament consists of legislator elected by plurality rule in single-member 
constituencies within the 16 German states (Länder). Those politicians hold a direct man-
date. The other half (and usually more owing to overhang mandates and leveling seats) 
consists of legislators who are elected by proportional rule at the state level and enter 
parliament through closed state party lists. Voters cast two ballots simultaneously, the so-
called first and second vote. Parties nominate either no candidates or exactly one candidate 
for direct election in each constituency. The candidate winning the plurality of first votes 
wins the direct mandate and enters the federal parliament. Voters cast their second vote 
for a party list at the state level. The ranking of candidates on the party lists is determined 
by secret pre-election ballots in decentralized conferences of state delegates in each state. 
The state list is not influenced directly by national party leaders. Usually, well-known can-
didates from the state are ranked in top positions. Parties also aim for representation of 
different regions in the state or opt for candidates with different backgrounds. Some parties 
have adopted self-imposed female quotas. The second vote guarantees overall proportional 
representation in parliament since the share of seats a party wins in a state is proportional 
to its second vote share (conditional on obtaining 5% of all votes nationwide). Subtracting 
the party’s direct mandates from its overall seats at the state level yields the number of 
legislators elected from the party list. Party lists are closed so that preference voting is not 
possible. Only those candidates with the highest ranks obtain a list mandate and enter the 
federal parliament. When the number of direct mandates in a state exceeds the number of 
seats a party is entitled to according to its second vote share, the respective party can keep 
the excess mandates as a bonus. Owing to those so-called “overhang mandates”, the final 
number of actual members in the German Bundestag usually exceeds the statutory number 
of legislators, which has been 598 since 2002.3
Candidates usually make use of the possibility of running for election as a direct candi-
date in a constituency and being placed simultaneously on the state party list to raise their 
chances of entering parliament. They rely on the party list as a fallback option if they do 
not win a direct mandate in their constituency. In the period from 1953 to 2017, 73.4% of 
all legislators were candidates competing for a direct mandate and they were on the party 
list simultaneously. A total of 15.9% ran as direct candidates in a constituency without 
3 Since 2013, overhang mandates have been compensated for by receiving leveling seats to restore the pro-
portionality of second vote results (Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG 2 BvF 3/11, July 25, 2012). Our 
identification strategy is not affected by either the overhang mandates or leveling seats because it relies 
solely on the existence of the mixed-member electoral system.
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party list fallback options; 10.7% of the legislators were candidates only on state party 
lists4 and cannot be linked to competitors in specific constituencies. Candidates who win 
a plurality in their constituency must accept a direct mandate.5 They are later omitted from 
the party list when mandates are allocated from the list. However, candidates defeated in 
the direct election might still receive a mandate from the closed state party list if they are 
ranked high enough. Whether a defeated direct candidate finally receives a mandate from 
the party list is the combined result of his/her ranking on the party list and the party’s sec-
ond vote result in that state. Consequently, mandates from the different party lists are not 
distributed equally over constituencies (e.g., Frank & Stadelmann 2021).
The direct mandates ensure that every constituency is represented by at least one legis-
lator. Additional legislators who lose the direct election but then enter parliament through 
the party list increase the constituency’s representation (e.g., Maaser & Stratmann, 2016; 
Frank & Stadelmann, 2021). The additional legislators per constituency always are from 
different parties because parties are allowed to have only one candidate per constituency. 
They are competitors, and they can be benchmarked against one another directly regard-
ing their parliamentary activity. The number of elected legislators per constituency has an 
upper bound defined by the number of parties in parliament, and it varied from one to five 
from 1953 to 2017, that is, the number of elected competitors from the same constituency, 
yet other parties vary from zero up to a maximum number of four.
2.2  Roll‑call votes
Voting in parliamentary sessions is one of the central tasks of legislators (Besley & Lar-
cinese, 2011). Voters, media, and competing legislators criticize politicians regularly for 
legislative shirking and high absences in parliamentary sessions.6 Because (sub-)commit-
tee sessions, meetings of parliamentary groups, and other parliamentary bodies are sched-
uled during parliamentary sessions, however, low participation in plenum sessions does not 
necessarily imply legislative shirking. We rely on absenteeism in roll-call votes as a meas-
ure of legislative shirking as is commonly done in the literature (e.g., Gagliarducci et al. 
2010; Besley & Larcinese, 2011; Bernecker, 2014). Roll-call votes frequently are requested 
for controversial topics, economic policy, and so on, accounting for roughly 5% of all votes 
on final bill passage in Germany (Sieberer et al., 2020). When roll-call votes are scheduled, 
no other committee sessions or meetings interfere. Individual voting behavior is published 
after roll calls, including information on whether a legislator missed the vote. We measure 
the share of all roll-call votes in a legislative period for which a legislator is absent.
Participation in roll-call votes is compulsory and an unexcused absence currently 
entails a deduction of 100 euros from the legislator’s monthly lump sum pay (§13(2) 
4 This share includes legislators from West-Berlin who were designated by the House of Representatives of 
Berlin until 1990.
5 We are aware of only four cases wherein the winner of the race in the constituency refused the mandate 
and did not enter the federal parliament (Holger Börner in 1976; Franz-Josef Strauß in 1980 & 1983; and 
Oskar Lafontaine in 1990).
6 To provide two recent examples for Germany: Der Spiegel notes that representatives often shirk on Fri-
days (see https:// www. spieg el. de/ polit ik/ deuts chland/ bunde stag- abgeo rdnete- fehlen- am- liebs ten- freit ag-a- 
12726 66. html, accessed October 15, 2020), and the tabloid Bild provides a ranking of legislators who often 
miss parliamentary sessions (see https:// www. bild. de/ bild- plus/ polit ik/ 2019/ polit ik/ bunde stag- die- abwes 
enhei tslis te- der- bunde stags abgeo rdnet en- 62654 054, accessed October 15, 2020). For further examples and 
anecdotes see Online Appendix B.
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Geschäftsordnung des Deutschen Bundestages und Geschäftsordnung des Vermittlungsau-
sschusses and §14(2) Abgeordnetengesetz). Moreover, German voters have been shown to 
punish legislators for high absenteeism (Bernecker, 2014). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that parties put pressure on legislators to attend roll calls.7 The salience of roll-call votes, 
the media attention they receive, mandatory participation, and the fines lead us to the con-
clusion that absences in roll-call votes are a conservative measure for legislative shirking.
2.3  Data
Bergmann et al. (2018a, 2018b) report data on voting behavior in all roll-call votes in the 
German Bundestag over the 1953–2013 period, along with information on legislators’ 
characteristics. We augmented their collected data using the same sources for 2013 to 2017 
to include the most recent full legislative period. Roll-call votes are obtained from the pub-
lications of the Bundestag administration, and we rely on personal biographies from the 
Bundestag’s website and the Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestags 
(Data Handbook on the History of the German Bundestag) to add further bibliographical 
details. Our dataset covers 64 years from the second to the 18th legislative period. The first 
legislative period of the Bundestag (1949–1953) is not suitable for our empirical analysis 
owing to differences in the electoral system.
Our final sample includes all legislators who ran for a direct mandate only (15.9%) and 
those who ran for a direct mandate and were placed simultaneously on a party list (73.4%). 
We must drop legislators from the sample who ran for election solely on closed state party 
lists because they cannot be linked to constituencies (10.7%). If legislators served less than 
half of a legislative period, we omit observations from the respective shortened period for 
reasons of precision (< 3.9%).8 In total, we obtain a final dataset of 8734 observations from 
3006 distinct individual legislators over 17 legislative periods.
Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides summary statistics. The outcome variable 
Absentee rate in roll-call votes is the number of recorded votes a legislator misses divided 
by the overall number of roll-call votes during his/her term in one legislative period. The 
average rate of missed roll-call votes is 12.5%. We also construct the share of days on 
which a legislator misses at least one roll-call vote (average 15.1%) as an alternative meas-
ure of absenteeism.
Our main explanatory variable, Elected competitors in constituency, is a binary variable 
indicating whether a legislator serves with competitors in parliament elected from the same 
constituency but representing other parties. The variable is zero for legislators without any 
competitor elected from the same constituency.9 Elected competitors in constituency mir-
rors precisely the peculiarities of the German two-tiered electoral system that we exploit. 
For 84.2% of our observations, legislators face at least one competitor elected from the 
same constituency in parliament. To provide further information on the composition of that 
number, a majority of 55.6% of legislators in our sample faces competition from exactly 
8 If those observations are included, our results and interpretations do not change (see Robustness Checks).
9 We obtain qualitatively similar results when entering the number of elected competitors from the same 
constituency as the explanatory variable (see Table A2 in the Online Appendix).
7 Carl Eduard Graf von Bismarck has obtained the unflattering title of “Germany’s laziest politician “ (see 
https:// www. suedd eutsc he. de/ polit ik/ carl- eduard- graf- von- bisma rck- deuts chlan ds- fauls ter- polit iker- tritt- 
ab-1. 352492, accessed February 26, 2020), and the Christian conservatives pressured him to behave differ-
ently.
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one elected legislator from the same constituency, while 25.0% have exactly two elected 
competitors, 3.4% of the legislature have exactly three elected competitors, 0.2% of rep-
resentatives in the Bundestag have a maximum number of four competitors, and 15.8% of 
legislators face no competitors elected from the same constituency. The mean number of 
elected competitors is 1.17 and the median number is one. Figure A1 in the Online Appen-
dix suggests that the existence of elected competitors relates negatively to absenteeism; 
Figure A2 shows that the fraction of legislators with no elected competitor varies moder-
ately over time, from 11.9% to 26.8%.
We also enter several standard measures of electoral competition, including Vote mar-
gin (the differences in first votes), the number of Direct candidates in the constituency, 
or Parliamentary group size, all of which are employed in the literature (e.g., Bernecker, 
2014; Gavoille & Verschelde, 2017). This allows us to ask whether Elected competitors in 
constituency matters independently of other forms of competition, that is, whether Elected 
competitors in constituency controls for different aspects of political competition.
Regarding other variables in our dataset, we account for holding a direct mandate, being 
a member of a party in government, age at the beginning of the legislative period, and 
legislative tenure. Moreover, we enter indicators related to positions and the experiences of 
legislators. All such variables serve as controls and have been employed previously in the 
related literature (e.g., Gagliarducci et al. 2011; Mocan & Altindag, 2013).
3  Identification strategy
3.1  Fixed effects regression framework
More political competition amongst elected competitors makes it easier for voters to eval-
uate legislative performance, to compare and contrast legislators amongst one another 
through benchmarking, and to penalize undesired behavior when legislative or representa-
tional duties are neglected. Hence, legislative shirking is supposed to become more costly 
when legislators have competitors from the same constituency. In our final sample, 73.2% 
of all observations comprise legislators who are reelected. Thus, the likelihood is high that 
politicians compete in elections with other elected legislators from the same constituency 
to whom they can be compared directly.10
We leverage the German mixed electoral system to analyze the effect of more political 
competition from elected competitors from the same constituency on the absentee rate in 
roll-call votes. We start by specifying the following regression framework:
The unit of observation in our analysis is legislator-legislative-period-specific, that is, 
we explain the Absentee rate in roll-call votes of legislator i in legislative period t. Elected 
competitors in constituency serves as the main explanatory variable. Vector X
it
 contains 
typical covariates to control for mandate type, being a member of a party in government 
or a minister, age and tenure as well as alternative measures of electoral competition. 
(1)
Absentee rate in roll-call votes
it










10 Elected legislators from the same constituency also may provide a relevant benchmark for voters even if 
one of them does not run for reelection.
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Legislative period fixed effects μ
t
 account for common changes affecting all legislators 
over time, such as changes in legislators’ salaries and differences in monitoring technol-
ogy such as news coverage (see, e.g., Mocan & Altindag, 2013; Braendle, 2014; Fisman 
et al. 2015; Hofer, 2017). Most important, the panel structure allows us to include legis-
lator fixed effects λ
i
 to consider all legislator-specific characteristics that remain constant 
over time, including observable ones (gender, occupation, and political experience at lower 
levels of government) and potentially unobservable ones such as charisma or personality 
traits. Including legislator fixed effects ensures that we compare the same legislators over 
time in  situations when they face elected competitors in their constituency to situations 
when they do not face such competition; thus, 1 captures the relevance of elected competi-
tors for the same legislator. We expect 𝛽1 < 0 , if competition reduces absentee rates. The 
error term is denoted by ε
it
.
Our legislator fixed effects approach goes some way toward establishing the effect of 
competition on absenteeism in roll-call votes, but political ability or valence may be time-
variant and unobservable, which might lead to biased coefficient estimates.11 Legislators 
who elevate their political abilities will strengthen their chances of winning a direct man-
date. Legislators whose political abilities decline over time will have lower probabilities of 
winning a direct mandate but might still receive a mandate from the party list. Having a list 
mandate implies that the number of competitors from the same constituency is at least one 
because exactly one legislator always is elected directly. Hence, political ability likely cor-
relates negatively with our measure of political competition. More able politicians could be 
more involved in the legislative work of their party groups and receive more attention from 
voters, the media and interest groups, such that they are less likely to miss roll-call votes. If 
changes in political ability correlate negatively with both Elected competitors in constitu-
ency and Absentee rate in roll-call votes, we should have an upward bias of 1 in an OLS 
fixed effects framework, that is, our setting will underestimate the negative effect of com-
petition on legislative shirking if changes in political ability are not considered.
3.2  Instrumental variables strategy and fixed effects
To account for potential bias and to estimate the causal effect of political competition on 
absenteeism, we adopt an instrumental variables strategy in a 2SLS setting including fixed 
effects. We leverage variation in the number of elected competitors from the same constitu-
ency by investigating legislators leaving parliament during the legislative period.12
The reasons for legislators ending their tenure during the legislative period are the fol-
lowing: 32.4% leave parliament owing to sickness and unexpected death; 26.8% accept 
a higher political post, such as prime minister or minister in a state, state secretary and 
Federal President; 15.2% accept a different mandate, for example, at the European Union, 
state level or as a mayor; 10.0% leave for jobs in the public sector and 3.9% for jobs in the 
private sector; 7.0% depart for other reasons13 unrelated to electoral competition within 
12 Jennes and Persyn (2015) adopt a comparable strategy when instrumenting the representation of Belgian 
constituencies with resigning ministers.
13 Such cases include retired civil servants who made use of a short time window between two legislative 
periods to circumvent regulations that the rights and obligations of civil servants are suspended when they 
are member of the federal parliament: the old term officially continues after the election for the new parlia-
ment already has taken place until the new parliament is constituted. Knowing that they were elected again, 
some retired civil servants resigned at the very end of the old legislative period to be reactivated as a civil 
11 If ability or valence were time-invariant, they would be captured in the fixed effects.
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their constituency; and only 4.7% of dropouts are linked to scandals. We cannot identify 
a specific reason for six legislators who left parliament during the legislative period since 
the start of our dataset in 1953. It is unlikely, and in many cases impossible, that parties 
systematically delay dropouts of legislators to manage and thereby influence representation 
or competition in certain constituencies: legislators may die during their terms or their new 
function legally is incompatible with holding a mandate, for example, when they become 
Federal President, minister in a state, state secretary, civil servant in another function or 
judge at the Constitutional Court. It is, thus, realistic to expect reasons for dropping out of 
parliament to be independent of the time-varying characteristics of other legislators in the 
constituency.
3.2.1  Early termination induces changes in competition in two constituencies
In Germany, no by-elections are held to fill a vacant mandate. Instead, the electoral law 
requires the mandate to be filled by the next candidate from the respective state party list 
within one week. More important, Germany’s rule-based mechanism does not allow par-
ties to target constituencies with additional representatives during the legislative period for 
electoral or competitive considerations. Mandates are not filled at all if the party of the 
legislator who drops out holds an overhang mandate in that state or if no other candidates 
remain on the party list who would accept it. By construction of the electoral system, any 
replacement candidate always must be either a defeated candidate from another constitu-
ency in that state or a candidate who ran for election only on the party list. To make it 
entirely clear: If a legislator drops out from parliament, his/her constituency always loses 
a representative, while another constituency potentially gains an additional representative 
who was not elected previously to parliament.
Legislators who leave parliament during the legislative period therefore induce changes 
in political competition in two constituencies. Thus, we create two binary variables to 
instrument the variable Elected competitors in constituency: Early dropout in constituency 
takes a value of one for legislator i at time t if another competitor elected from his/her 
constituency terminates his/her term within the first half of the legislative period. Replace-
ment in constituency equals one for legislator i at time t if a not yet elected candidate from 
the constituency receives the replacement mandate from the list within the first half of the 
legislative period.14
14 A tradeoff is encountered when considering changes in political competition induced during the first half 
of the legislative period. On the one hand, it reduces the number of observations we count as legislators 
who drop out or as replacement candidates, thus making it potentially more difficult in our setting to find an 
effect. On the other hand, the effect that dropouts and their respective replacement candidates have on com-
petition within constituencies and on later absentee rates can be measured more accurately if those changes 
apply to a large portion of the legislative period.
servant. The opportunity is given to them of being promoted or enlarging their pension claims as a civil 
servant before they re-enter parliament again when the new term starts.
Footnote 13 (continued)
564 Public Choice (2021) 189:555–575
1 3
3.2.2  2SLS estimation strategy
We employ Early dropout in constituency and Replacement in constituency as two instru-
mental variables. The first-stage equation in our instrumental variables approach is as 
follows:
Elected competitors in constituency is explained by our two instruments as well as the 
vector of covariates X
it
 , legislator and legislative period fixed effects. We then use the pre-
diction to explain absentee rates:
We estimate the model implied by Eqs. (2) and (3) with a 2SLS estimator. The effect 
of political competition on Absentee rate in roll-call votes is identified in the second stage 
regression by the instrumented variable Elected competitors in constituency, which itself 
is explained by the instruments. Following the discussion of our fixed effects regression 









| , as both coefficients are expected to be negative).
To serve as valid instrumental variables, Early dropout in constituency and Replace-
ment in constituency should correlate strongly with the main explanatory variable Elected 
competitors in constituency. At the same time, the instruments should be orthogonal to the 
error term ε
it
 . That is the case for Early dropout in constituency and Replacement in con-
stituency: Whether and why competitors resign is the result of personal or career consider-
ations or unfortunate circumstances and, hence, independent of other legislators from both 
the same and other constituencies. Legislators leaving parliament during the legislative 
period should not affect the absentee rates of other legislators in his/her constituency and 
certainly not legislators representing constituencies wherein resignation leads to a replace-
ment candidate obtaining a mandate for reasons beyond the induced change in political 
competition.15 Dropouts and replacements directly affect political competition in terms of 
the number of competitors, as will be shown below.
Overall, we can construct our instruments based on 255 legislators who drop out and 
167 who replace them. Table A1 in the Online Appendix shows that about 3.6% of elected 
competitors may benefit from other legislators from the same constituency dropping out 
and that 4.6% of observations are affected owing to replacements.16
(2)
Elected competitors in constituency
it
= 1Early dropout in constituencyit
+ 2Replacement in constituencyit + Xit + i + t + it.
(3)
Absentee rate in roll-call votes
it
= 1 ̂Elected competitors in constituencyit + Xit + λi + μt + εit.
15 Replacement candidates might be more prone to being controlled by the party whip, which may affect 
their attendance and that of other members of their faction. As a reaction, other factions could adjust their 
behavior accordingly and discipline their members such that the legislator from the replacement candidate’s 
constituency has a lower absentee rate owing to a channel other than competition in the constituency. That 
scenario is unlikely and we have not seen evidence that more experienced legislators look at replacement 
candidates from their own factions (who lost in their constituency and might have been further down the 
party list) as role models. Moreover, such reactions across parties to replacement candidates would imply 
that the replacement candidates should have lower absentee rates, which is not the case.
16 The difference in the means of Early dropout in constituency and Replacement in constituency purely is 
mechanical because the replacement candidate necessarily enters a constituency represented already by at 
least one member of parliament.
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4  Results
4.1  Fixed effects regressions: The link between elected competitors and absentee 
rates
Table 1 shows the link between Elected competitors in constituency and Absentee rate in 
roll-call votes accounting for mandate type, being a member of the government party, age, 
tenure, being a minister as well as individual legislator and time fixed effects in an OLS 
fixed-effects setting as specified in Eq. (1).
Specification (1) suggests that being a legislator who faces elected competitors from the 
same constituency is associated with a statistically significant lower absentee rate. Quanti-
tatively, being a legislator who faces elected competitors reduces absentee rates by about 
1.0 percentage point. The signs of the other covariates are mostly as expected. Being a 
directly elected legislator reduces absentee rates (Gagliarducci et al. 2011), members of the 
parties in government miss parliamentary sessions less often, being a minister increases 
absentee rates, legislators tend to be absent more often the longer they are members of 
the parliament (Tenure), and age itself is statistically insignificant. In specification (2), 
we enter additional covariates into our regression to control for more political positions. 
Elected competitors in constituency remains negatively related to Absentee rate in roll-call 
votes.17
Several roll-call votes may take place in the same parliamentary session. When creat-
ing our dependent variable Absentee rate in roll-call votes, it makes no difference whether 
a legislator misses, for example, five roll-call votes on the same day or five votes on days 
each with a single roll-call vote. We enter the share of days that legislators are absent at 
least once as an alternative dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) to account for fre-
quent roll-call votes on the same day. The link between Elected competitors in constituency 
and Share of days absent is comparable to the results using Absentee rate in roll-call votes 
as the dependent variable. If legislators face other elected competitors in their constituency, 
the share of days that they are absent from parliament is statistically lower.
4.2  Instrumental variables: The effect of elected competitors on absentee rates
We report the 2SLS regression results in Table 2. We enter Early dropout in constituency 
and Replacement in constituency as instruments for Elected competitors in constituency.
The first stage results in all columns of panel (b) indicate that our instruments correlate 
strongly with Elected competitors in constituency. As expected, the variable Early drop-
out in constituency affects competition negatively, while the variable Replacement in con-
stituency affects competition positively. F-statistics for the excluded instruments indicate 
that the instruments are not weak. The first-stage results underscore the relevance of our 
instruments in explaining political competition from other elected legislators, as could be 
expected given the institutional setting.
17 Parliamentary presidents, chairs of parliamentary groups, and whips miss recorded votes less often. 
Being a junior minister and chair of a committee has just as small of an effect on absentee rates as does 
experience as a minister or junior minister from previous legislative periods (coefficients not shown in 
Table 1).
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We explore a parsimonious 2SLS specification without controls in column (1) of panel 
(a). The coefficient of Elected competitors in constituency is statistically significant and 
negative. Adding personal time-variant covariates, legislator fixed effects, and legislative 
period fixed effects in column (2) as well as additional political positions controls in col-
umn (3), we find that the statistically significant and negative effect persists but becomes 
smaller in magnitude. The existence of elected competitors from the same constituency, 
which owes to dropouts or replacements, leads to a reduction in the absentee rate by about 
6.1 percentage points, which is larger than the OLS results of Table 1, as expected.18 That 
effect is quantitatively substantial and corresponds to about 49% of the average absen-
tee rate in roll-call votes (12.5%). Thus, competition from other elected legislators in the 
same constituency explains about half of the average absentee rate. Hansen’s J-statistic and 
respective p-values, as reported in Table 2, corroborate the argument that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term and suggest that the instruments are econometrically 
valid.
The IV results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar when using the Share of days 
absent as the dependent variable in columns (4)-(6). Dropouts and replacements affect 
electoral competition (first stage), and competition from elected competitors negatively 
affects legislators’ absentee rates.19 Overall, the 2SLS results point to a substantial effect 
of having elected competitors from the same constituency, which is revealed in actual par-
liamentary behavior. As hypothesized and consistent with theory, voters could be able to 
evaluate legislators’ representation efforts better and may make more informed decisions 
in elections once benchmarking becomes easier. Shirking therefore is more costly for leg-
islators when they can be compared effectively to competitors who are active in the same 
political environment, that is, in the same constituency. Direct electoral competition may 
thus drive legislative competition in parliament which affects parliamentary activity.
4.3  Robustness checks and refinements
Table 3 reports a series of robustness checks.20 We continue to employ our instrumental 
variables strategy. Next to the existence of elected competitors from the same constituency, 
other aspects of political competition like the closeness of elections or the number candi-
dates who run for a direct election in the constituency might be important to explain leg-
islative shirking. In particular, candidates in contested constituencies might receive higher 
positions on state party lists as a reward or to secure their election. Constituencies that are 
competitive for reasons other than the number of elected legislators might end up with sev-
eral representatives. Thus, further exploration considering alternative dimensions of politi-
cal competition becomes relevant.
We investigate whether the effect of Elected competitors in constituency is independ-
ent of commonly used measures of political competition in our Table  3 regressions. 
18 Testing for a direct effect of Early dropout in constituency and Replacement in constituency on Absen-
tee rate in roll-call votes in a reduced form approach yields results that are fully consistent with the main 
findings: Legislators whose constituencies receive a replacement candidate have lower absentee rates while 
legislators from constituencies with a competitor who drops out miss more often.
19 We also note that the coefficients of Elected competitors in constituency in Table  2, Panel (a) are, as 
expected (see Sect. 3), larger in absolute terms than the respective coefficients in Table 1.
20 To save space we do not report results with Share of days absent as a dependent variable. Our insights 
and interpretations do not change when entering that variable (results are available upon request).
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In column (1), we enter vote margins following, for example, Galasso and Nannicini 
(2011). Vote margins are positive for legislators with direct mandates (margins over 
runner-up in direct elections) and negative for legislators from the party list (difference 
to winner of the direct mandate).
We suspect that the effect of vote margins is non-linear and largest when legislators 
are either closely elected or not elected. Hence, we also enter the squared vote margin. 
The effect of Elected competitors in constituency remains unchanged, that is, statisti-
cally significant, negative and with an absolute size corresponding to about 6.1 percent-
age points.
In column (2), we include two further measures of political competition: Closeness 
constituency is the difference in the vote shares of the first and second candidate in the 
direct election, allowing us to consider the direct mandate contest within a constituency. 
We expect direct elections to be more competitive when voters can choose amongst more 
alternatives and therefore enter the number of Direct candidates, which is the sum of all 
candidates running for direct election in the constituency. The effect of Elected competitors 
in constituency remains statistically significant, negative, and of the same size as before. 
Table 1  The effect of elected competitors in constituency on the absentee rate in roll-call votes (OLS fixed 
effects)
OLS fixed effects estimation. The unit of observation is an individual legislator-legislative period pair. The 
dependent variables are the share of missed roll-call votes in columns (1) and (2) and the share of days 
a roll-call vote is missed at least once in columns (3) and (4). Political position controls include Junior 
minister, (vice) Parl. president, (vice) Chair committee, (vice) Chair parl. group, Whip, Experience as min-
ister, Experience as jun. minister. Standard error estimates are clustered at the legislator level. *p < 0.1, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Absentee rate in roll-call votes Share of days absent
Elected competitors in constituency −0.00996** −0.00903** −0.00894* −0.00784*
(0.00457) (0.00458) (0.00459) (0.00456)
Direct mandate −0.0116* −0.0102* −0.0139** −0.0122**
(0.00608) (0.00605) (0.00610) (0.00605)
Government party −0.0401*** −0.0404*** −0.0481*** −0.0490***
(0.00367) (0.00375) (0.00376) (0.00383)
Age 0.00353 0.00387 0.00655 0.00642
(0.00699) (0.00697) (0.00729) (0.00725)
Age2 −0.00001 −0.00003 −0.00002 −0.00003
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Tenure 0.0402*** 0.0460*** 0.0384*** 0.0451***
(0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0137)
Minister 0.0982*** 0.0920*** 0.106*** 0.0988***
(0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0138)
Political position controls No Yes No Yes
Legislator fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legislative period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8734 8734 8734 8734
Number of legislators 3006 3006 3006 3006
R-squared 0.255 0.262 0.337 0.347
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The other measures of political competition have the expected signs, but they are statisti-
cally insignificant.
Legislators have been found to be absent more often in their last term when reelection 
incentives no longer have any disciplining effect (Lott, 1987; Rothenberg & Sanders, 2000; 
Besley & Larcinese, 2011; Willumsen & Goetz, 2017). Results from column (3) confirm 
that finding and indicate that, in their last terms, legislators’ absentee rates are about 3.0 
percentage points higher. The size of the parliamentary faction has a negative impact, too.
In column (4), we take the distance of the legislators’ state to the seat of government 
into account (see, e.g., Willumsen, 2019). Distance is related to travel time, which may 
affect absentee rates. We exploit the change in the seat of government from Bonn to Ber-
lin in 1999 to account for distance and interact state dummies with a variable indicating 
whether the seat of parliament is in Berlin or not. The effect of the existence of elected 
competitors in the same constituency is unaffected by the inclusion of those additional con-
trols: its effect remains negative at about 6.2 percentage points.
The number of roll-call votes in which legislators are theoretically able to participate 
varies over legislative periods. The relative salience of a single roll-call vote in legislative 
Table 2  The effect of elected competitors in constituency on the absentee rate in roll-call votes (2SLS)
2SLS estimation. The unit of observation is an individual legislator-legislative period pair. The dependent 
variables are the share of missed roll-call votes in columns (1)-(3) and the share of days a roll-call vote is 
missed at least once in columns (4)-(6). Personal controls include Direct mandate, Government party, Age, 
Age2, Tenure and Minister as in Table  1. Political position controls include Junior minister, (vice) Parl. 
president, (vice) Chair committee, (vice) Chair parl. group, Whip, Experience as minister, Experience as 
jun. minister. Standard error estimates are clustered at the legislator level. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Absentee rate in roll-call votes Share of days absent
Panel (a): Second stage results
Elected competitors in 
constituency
−0.142*** −0.0613*** −0.0614*** −0.149*** −0.0576** −0.0577**
(0.0329) (0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0337) (0.0226) (0.0226)
Dependent variable Elected competitors in constituency
Panel (b): First stage results for instruments only
Early dropout in con-
stituency
−0.290*** −0.367*** −0.367*** −0.290*** −0.367*** −0.367***
(0.0283) (0.0315) (0.0315) (0.0283) (0.0315) (0.0315)
Replacement in constitu-
ency
0.164*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.164*** 0.122*** 0.123***
(0.00609) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.00609) (0.0145) (0.0144)
Controls (for all panels)
Personal controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Political position 
controls
No No Yes No No Yes
Legislator fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Legislative period fixed 
effects
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 8734 8734 8734 8734 8734 8734
Number of legislators 3006 3006 3006 3006 3006 3006
F-statistic first stage 432.4 102.1 102.3 432.4 102.1 102.3
Hansen J-statistic 
(p-val.)
0.134 0.756 0.688 0.108 0.700 0.636
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periods with only a few votes might make it more costly for legislators to miss. To test 
whether our results are driven by periods with small numbers of roll-call votes, we drop 
observations from legislators who were able to (theoretically) participate only in fewer than 
30 or 50 recorded votes in columns (5) and (6), respectively. If anything, the point esti-
mates for Elected competitors in constituency increase slightly in absolute terms in those 
subsamples. The effect always remains negative and statistically significant.
Tables A2–A4 in the Online Appendix show a large array of additional robustness 
checks and offers further discussions. In Table A2, we account for the fact that up to five 
representatives can be elected from one constituency and replace the binary measure of 
competition with the number of elected competitors. In Table A3, we concentrate on dif-
ferent samples to test for the robustness of our main results, thereby taking account of dif-
ferent incentives regarding participation in roll-call votes. Table A4 explores more nuanced 
measures of Absentee rate in roll-call votes, by analyzing excused and unexcused absences 
separately, votes versus days or legislative shirking in the first versus the second half of the 
legislative period. All robustness tests support our main interpretation: Elected competitors 
from the same constituency affect the legislative activity by reducing legislative shirking.
To investigate the effect of elected competitors on legislative shirking further and to 
explore additional implications of its theoretical underpinning, we conduct an analysis for 
subgroups of legislators in Table 4.
Legislators from the large parties (Christian conservatives, CDU/CSU, and the social 
democrats, SPD) normally compete for direct constituency mandates, while legislators 
from smaller parties have little chance to win such mandates. For politicians from smaller 
parties, it is more important to have promising positions on the party list. Consequently, the 
existence of elected competitors is expected to influence the legislative behavior of politi-
cians from large parties more strongly. In columns (1) and (2), we estimate regressions for 
subsamples of legislators from larger and smaller parties. As expected, we find a negative 
and statistically significant effect of Elected competitors in constituency on Absentee rate 
in roll-call votes for legislators from larger parties. The effect is not statistically signifi-
cant for legislators from small parties.21 If we replaced Elected competitors in constituency 
with the number of competitors to allow for more variation in the competition variable, we 
would obtain a negative and statistically significant effect of having elected competitors 
even for small parties.
Columns (3) and (4) differentiate between legislators who are elected directly in the 
constituencies and those gaining seats from the closed state party list. For both groups, we 
find a negative effect that is statistically significant and quantitatively comparable to our 
main results. No evidence is found that the effect of elected competitors from the same 
constituency is restricted to legislators elected in the plurality voting tier. One potential 
explanation why the existence of elected competitors and benchmarking possibilities 
are relevant for legislators elected in the proportional tier is that they usually run again 
as a direct candidate in the constituency so that their performance relative to the legisla-
tor with the direct mandate matters. Even if legislators have small chances of winning in 
21 The statistical insignificance and the large point estimate for the sample of politicians from smaller par-
ties was to be expected owing to our instrumental variables setting: Virtually no variation exists in our com-
petition variable for the sample of legislators from smaller parties. That is because they are elected mostly 
from the party lists. Consequently, the number of elected competitors they face from the same constituency 
almost always is at least one and often even more because an additional legislator from the defeated can-
didates of a larger party supervenes. Indeed, the instrumentation strategy yields small F-statistics for the 
excluded instruments in the first stage.
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the constituency because they are from smaller parties, parties usually profit from strong 
candidates in the constituencies because they improve their second vote shares. Finally, as 
stated above, legislators who are comparatively successful in direct elections might also be 
rewarded in the conferences of state delegates with higher positions on the party list.
Column (5) shows that the effect of political competition is negative and statistically 
significant when legislators win or lose within a 15 percentage point margin, that is, when 
the direct election is comparatively close. On the other hand, if winners are elected safely 
(e.g., by more than a 15 percentage point margin) and the losers care more about their posi-
tions on the party list, we would expect that having more elected competitors might be less 
relevant for winners and losers (corresponding to the results of column 6). Thus, (expected) 
vote margins can moderate the effect of elected competitors on absentee rates.
Having elected competitors from the same constituency may matter more when they 
contest the direct mandate in the next election. In column (7), we drop all observations of 
legislators having two or more elected competitors. In column (8), observations of legisla-
tors with exactly one elected competitor are omitted. A larger number of competitors from 
the same constituency increases the likelihood that the additional legislators are candidates 
from smaller parties who lose the direct election with a large difference in first votes. They 
represent a smaller electoral threat to those competing for the direct mandate. The point 
estimates in column (7) are negative and statistically significant. In column (8), the point 
estimates are negative, somewhat smaller than column (7), and statistically insignificant, as 
expected.
Next to absentee rates, the roll-call vote data allow us to study deviations from the 
party line. The deviation rate is the number of times a legislator votes against his/her party 
majority divided by the number of roll-call votes in which he/she participates.22 Party dis-
cipline is strongly enforced in Germany, and the mean deviation rate in our sample is only 
2.5%. Interestingly, however, column (9) shows that legislators having elected competitors 
from the same constituency deviate less often from the party line. Having elected com-
petitors from the same constituency reduces the deviation rate by 1.5 percentage points in 
our 2SLS estimations, which is substantial given the high levels of party discipline. More 
elected competitors at the constituency level seem to make the fallback party list option 
and hence voting with the party line more relevant owing to the German electoral system.
5  Conclusion
We analyze the effect of political competition on legislative shirking in roll-call votes using 
data from the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2017. We leverage the German mixed elec-
toral system, which institutionally leads to differences in the number of elected legisla-
tors from the same constituency but representing different parties. Having more elected 
legislators from the same constituency is relevant because it allows voters to evaluate 
their representatives’ efforts and to compare them with each other under the same circum-
stances. Exogenous variation in the number of competitors per constituency is established 
by accounting for legislators who leave parliament during the legislative period and their 
respective replacement candidates as instruments. That empirical strategy allows us to 
22 Three observations are dropped from our sample in the estimation of deviations from the party line 
because the corresponding legislators missed all roll-call votes they potentially could have attended.
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identify the effect of political competition induced by elected competitors on legislative 
shirking in an instrumental variables setting.
We find that legislators who face elected competitors from the same constituency reduce 
their absentee rates by about 6.1 percentage points. The effect is substantial and corre-
sponds to nearly 49% of the mean absentee rate. The effect of elected competitors is robust 
to the inclusion of individual fixed effects and other covariates found to be relevant predic-
tors of legislative shirking. The effect also is independent of other measures of political 
competition commonly used in the literature. Our result suggests that, apart from the rel-
evance of political competition for legislative shirking, elected competitors from the same 
constituency might be seen as a heretofore neglected aspect of political competition.
Evidence from our regression analysis indicates that our measure of political competi-
tion also impacts deviation from the party line in roll-call votes in addition to its effect 
on absentee rates. Future research may investigate the congruence of deviation from party 
lines induced by political competition. Such research might explore the effect of political 
competition on other legislative behavior, including the number of speeches, interpella-
tions, and social media activity. Because mixed electoral systems are becoming more and 
more prevalent in different countries, our measure of competition and our empirical strat-
egy may be applied elsewhere.
The possibility of contrasting legislators who represent the same geographic constitu-
ency in the same general political environment is not limited to mixed electoral systems. 
Thus, the disciplining function of elected competitors likewise could take effect in other 
contexts, for example, in pure proportional systems. Even in pure majoritarian systems, 
voters might compare the performances of elected legislators to some degree although they 
typically do not compete directly against one another at the same time. However, it could 
be expected that US Senators, for instance, are benchmarked by voters against one another. 
Similarly, usually two Councils of States are elected in Swiss cantons at the same time and 
voters hold two votes such that they may also be compared in parliament.
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